Waseem Khan v. Attorney General United States by unknown
2020 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
11-3-2020 
Waseem Khan v. Attorney General United States 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020 
Recommended Citation 
"Waseem Khan v. Attorney General United States" (2020). 2020 Decisions. 1031. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020/1031 
This November is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted 






UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






WASEEM AHSAN KHAN,         




ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA, 
                                 Respondent 
____________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a Decision of 
the Board of Immigration Appeals 
[Agency No. 047-698-921] 
Immigration Judge: Daniel A. Morris 
____________ 
 
Argued July 8, 2020 
 
Before: KRAUSE, MATEY, and RENDELL Circuit Judges 
 





Eric M. Mark [ARGUED] 
201 Washington Street 
Newark, NJ 07102 
 Attorney for Petitioner 
 
Surell Brady 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation 
Room 5044 
P.O. Box 878 
Washington, DC 20044 
 
Sunah Lee [ARGUED] 
Andrew N. O’Malley 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation 
P.O. Box 878 
Washington, DC 20044 
                                 Attorneys for Respondent  
 
David A. Isaacson 
Cyrus D. Mehta & Partners 
One Battery Park Plaza 
9th Floor 
New York, NY 10004 
Attorney for Amici Curiae American Immigration 
Lawyers Association, National Immigration Project of 








OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.     
 The decision of some states to decriminalize the 
possession of personal-use quantities of marijuana has had 
collateral consequences well beyond the vacatur of thousands 
of convictions.  We deal today with a consequence for 
noncitizens whose commission of this type of offense, under 
applicable immigration laws, would normally “stop time” on 
the accrual of the years of continuous residence required to be 
eligible for cancellation of removal.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1229b(a)(2), 1229b(d)(1).  The question is whether that 
“stop-time rule” still applies if, post-conviction, the offense has 
been decriminalized and the conviction vacated as a result.  
Because we hold that a vacatur in this context does not affect 
the operation of the stop-time rule, we agree with the Board of 
Immigration Appeals that Petitioner in this case did not satisfy 
the continuous-residence requirement for eligibility for 
cancellation of removal, and we will deny his petition for 
review.   
I. Background  
Petitioner Waseem Ahsan Khan was admitted to the 
United States as a legal permanent resident (LPR) in 2000 and 
pleaded guilty to possession of less than one-half ounce of 
marijuana, in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 21a-279(c), in 
2006.  He was not subject to removal for that conviction 
because it was “a single offense involving possession for one’s 
own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana,” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), but that was not his only tangle with the 




In 2010, Khan was convicted for two counts of larceny 
in the third degree under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-124, and those 
offenses did subject him to removal as “convict[ions] of two or 
more crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a 
single scheme of criminal misconduct.”  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).  He was eventually served with a Notice 
to Appear in 2017, leading to the order of removal that is the 
subject of this petition.   
At each step along the way, Khan sought cancellation 
of removal, a discretionary form of relief that permits an 
otherwise removable noncitizen to remain in the country.1  See 
Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619, 1623 (2016).  As relevant to 
this appeal, he acknowledged that to be eligible for this relief, 
he must “ha[ve] resided in the United States continuously for 
7 years after having been admitted” as a LPR.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b(a)(2).  He also did not dispute that he could not meet 
that criterion if the “stop-time rule”—which stops the accrual 
of continuous residence when the noncitizen “has committed 
an offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2) . . . that renders the 
alien inadmissible to the United States under section 
1182(a)(2),” id. at § 1229b(d)(1)—applies to the marijuana 
offense he committed six years after being admitted.  But, he 
argued, the rule did not apply to him because Connecticut later 
decriminalized the underlying offense, see 2011 Conn. Acts 
No. 11-71 (Reg. Sess.), and he had applied for and been 
 
1 In the course of his removal proceedings, Khan also 
contested removability and sought various other forms of 
relief, but we need not address those rulings as they are not 





granted a vacatur of that conviction,2 see Conn. Gen. Stat. 
§ 54-142d. 
The Immigration Judge (IJ) disagreed on the ground 
that the vacatur was due to a “post-conviction event[],” rather 
than “on the basis of a procedural or substantive defect in the 
underlying proceeding[],” and therefore, pursuant to In re 
Pickering, 23 I. & N. Dec. 621 (BIA 2003), the conviction 
continued to carry immigration consequences.  A.R. 261.  The 
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) adopted the IJ’s 
reasoning and affirmed, reiterating that because “[t]he 
destruction of [Khan’s] conviction record was not based on any 
procedural or substantive defect in the conviction itself, but 
rather on subsequent events,” his continuous-residence period 
terminated when he “committed his drug possession offense.”  
App. 7.   
Khan timely petitioned for review of the BIA’s 
conclusion that his since-vacated conviction triggered the stop-
time rule.3   
 
2 For simplicity, we refer to the destruction of Khan’s 
conviction record under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-142d as a 
vacatur because this case does not require us to parse any 
differences there may be between expungement and vacatur, 
terms which we have noted “appear variously in . . . BIA 
opinions[] as synonymous.”  Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193, 
206 n.15 (3d Cir. 2005).   
 
3 In supplemental briefing, the parties addressed a 
potential threshold question—whether the stop-time rule, 




II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review  
The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. 
§§ 1003.1(b)(3) and 1240.15, and we have jurisdiction under 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  Although we lack jurisdiction over the 
“discretionary aspects of the denial of cancellation of 
removal,” Singh v. Att’y Gen., 807 F.3d 547, 549 n.3 (3d Cir. 
2015) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)), we retain 
jurisdiction over determinations regarding statutory eligibility, 
see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), including “[s]atisfaction of the 
continuous residency requirement,” Singh, 807 F.3d at 549 n.3.  
We review the BIA’s legal determination of ineligibility 
de novo and any factual findings for substantial evidence, 
Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 379 (3d Cir. 2010), and it 
is the noncitizen’s burden to demonstrate eligibility for 
cancellation of removal, see Singh, 807 F.3d at 550.   
III. Discussion 
On appeal, Khan again contends that he “has resided in 
the United States continuously for 7 years after having been 
admitted in any status,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2), because his 
 
1182(a)(2)” that renders the noncitizen either “inadmissible” 
or “removable,” requires that a LPR, who has already been 
“admitted” in that status, be rendered removable.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b(d)(1).  Because Khan’s marijuana offense could not 
have rendered him removable, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), 
only inadmissible, see § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), we held this case 
c.a.v. for the Supreme Court’s resolution of that question in 
Barton v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1442 (2020), which held LPRs may 
be rendered inadmissible for purposes of the stop-time rule, id. 




2006 marijuana offense—the inadmissibility offense that 
would otherwise trigger the stop-time rule—was 
decriminalized and his conviction vacated.  We first discuss the 
normal operation of the stop-time rule and then turn to the 
effect of a vacatur resulting from the offense’s 
decriminalization. 
A. The Normal Operation of the Stop-Time Rule 
As with any question of statutory interpretation, “we 
must begin with the statutory text,” A.A. v. Att’y Gen., 973 F.3d 
171, 180 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted), and because we 
“presume[] that Congress expresse[d] its intent through the 
ordinary meaning of its language,” we start with “an 
examination of the plain language of the statute,” id. (first and 
second alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  In particular, courts “normally interpret[] a 
statute in accord with the ordinary public meaning of its terms 
at the time of its enactment.”  Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Ga., 140 
S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020).   
In relevant part, the provision embodying the stop-time 
rule provides that a LPR’s continuous residence stops accruing 
if and when the LPR “has committed an offense referred to in 
section 1182(a)(2) . . . that renders the alien inadmissible to the 
United States under section 1182(a)(2).”4  8 U.S.C. 
 
4 In full, the statute provides that the continuous-
residence period terminates:   
(A) . . . when the alien is served a notice to 
appear under section 1229(a) of this title, or 




§ 1229b(d)(1).  Section 1182(a)(2), in turn, “renders 
inadmissible” any noncitizen who is “convicted of, or who 
admits having committed, or who admits committing acts 
which constitute the essential elements of (I) a crime involving 
moral turpitude . . . , or (II) a violation of . . . any law or 
regulation . . . relating to a controlled substance (as defined in 
section 802 of Title 21).”  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i).  It is 
undisputed that the marijuana offense to which Khan pleaded 
guilty met these criteria at the time and would have prevented 
Khan from having accrued the requisite seven years’ 
continuous residence in the normal course.  But in Khan’s case, 
the law later changed:  His offense of conviction is no longer a 
crime, so his conviction has been vacated.  The question for us 
is whether, under these changed circumstances, he should still 
 
referred to in section 1182(a)(2) of this title 
that renders the alien inadmissible to the 
United States under section 1182(a)(2) of 
this title or removable from the United States 
under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4) of 
this title, whichever is earliest. 
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1).  Khan was served a notice to appear 
well after his seven years’ continuous residence would have 
elapsed, so this case concerns only whether Khan committed a 
§ 1182(a)(2) offense that renders him “inadmissible . . . or 
removable.”  Id.  While we discuss here only the 
inadmissibility prong as relevant to Khan, our analysis pertains 
no less to the removability prong.  See Barton, 140 S. Ct. at 
1453 (explaining that “an offense that would render the 
noncitizen deportable under § 1227(a)(2) would also render the 




be considered to “ha[ve] committed an offense referred to in 
section 1182(a)(2) . . . that renders the alien inadmissible . . . 
under section 1182(a)(2).”  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1).  And the 
answer depends on what is required by this statutory text.   
By its terms, the stop-time rule is susceptible to two 
readings.  One is that the LPR previously committed one of the 
offenses specified in § 1182(a)(2), with the clause “that renders 
the alien inadmissible . . . under section 1182(a)(2)” serving 
merely to describe the significance of “an offense [being] 
referred to in section 1182(a)(2).”  The other is that the rule 
incorporates two distinct requirements:  (1) the LPR must have 
previously committed one of the offenses specified in 
§ 1182(a)(2), and (2) the LPR’s conviction of or admission to 
the offense “renders [him] inadmissible.”  But of the two 
possible readings, only the latter comports with the statutory 
text and finds support in precedent. 
As a textual matter, this second reading is proper for 
three reasons.  First, Congress’s use of different verb tenses in 
each of the clauses—present-perfect in “has committed” and 
present in “renders”—reflects its intent for the two clauses to 
define separate requirements.  See United States v. Wilson, 503 
U.S. 329, 333 (1992); Santos-Reyes v. Att’y Gen., 660 F.3d 
196, 199 (3d Cir. 2011).  Second, “[w]ords are to be given the 
meaning that proper grammar and usage would assign them,” 
United States v. Johnman, 948 F.3d 612, 618 (3d Cir. 2020) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 
954, 965 (2019)), and though not so well-recognized as to rise 
to the level of a grammatical canon, the word “that” prefacing 
the second clause generally serves as a restrictive pronoun 
introducing necessary, additional information—in contrast to 




clarifying information, see Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, 
Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 142–43 
(2012); see Calix v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 1000, 1005–06 n.4 (5th 
Cir. 2015).  Finally, it is a “cardinal principle of statutory 
construction that we must give effect, if possible, to every 
clause and word of a statute,” N.L.R.B. v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 
S. Ct. 929, 941 (2017) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted), but the first reading would make the clause “that 
renders . . . inadmissible” entirely superfluous, while the 
second reading “adhere[s] to the statutory text, which 
differentiates between the two [requirements],” Nasrallah v. 
Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1693 (2020), and thus gives distinct 
purpose to the “renders . . . inadmissible” clause.  
It is not surprising, then, that even before the Supreme 
Court weighed in, our sister circuits and the BIA had adopted 
the second reading and held that the clause “that renders the 
alien inadmissible . . . under section 1182(a)(2)” in fact 
“qualifies, rather than describes, the preceding clause,” Calix, 
784 F.3d at 1005 n.4, and thus “limit[s] . . . the types of 
offenses which cut off the accrual of further time” to those for 
which the petitioner has been “rendered inadmissible—by a 
conviction, admission of the criminal conduct, or through some 
other means,” Heredia v. Sessions, 865 F.3d 60, 69–70 (2d Cir. 
2017) (quoting In re Perez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 689, 693 (BIA 
1999)).  And Barton v. Barr last term solidified that view.  140 
S. Ct. 1442 (2020).   
There, the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the 
meaning of the stop-time rule in connection with a different 
question: whether a LPR—who is already considered 
“admitted” under the immigration code—can still trigger the 




inadmissible, or only by committing an offense that renders 
him removable.  See id. at 1447–48.  It concluded LPRs 
remained subject to the stop-time rule for inadmissibility 
offenses, see id. at 1450–51, but as relevant for our purposes, 
the Court also observed that the stop-time rule has two distinct 
requirements: 
First, cancellation of removal is precluded if a 
noncitizen committed a § 1182(a)(2) offense 
during the initial seven years of residence, even 
if . . . the conviction occurred after the seven 
years elapsed. . . . Second, the text of the law 
requires that the noncitizen be rendered 
“inadmissible” as a result of the offense. . . . 
[And] “while only commission is required at step 
one, conviction (or admission) is required at step 
two.” 
Barton, 140 S. Ct. at 1449–50 (quoting Barton v. Att’y Gen., 
904 F.3d 1294, 1301 (11th Cir. 2018)).   
In sum, based on both text and precedent, the stop-time 
inquiry involves two questions:  (1) Did the Petitioner commit 
one of the offenses identified in § 1182(a)(2) before accruing 
seven years’ continuous residence, and (2) was the Petitioner 
rendered inadmissible under § 1182(a)(2) as a result of that 
offense?  Id.; see also Barton, 904 F.3d at 1300, aff’d, Barton, 
140 S. Ct. 1442 (describing the two steps); Nguyen v. Sessions, 
901 F.3d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 2018), abrogated on other 
grounds by Barton, 140 S. Ct. 1442 (same); Heredia, 865 F.3d 
at 67 (same); Calix, 784 F.3d at 1008 (same).  As those 
questions guide our analysis concerning Khan, we consider 




resulting vacatur of his conviction change either of the 
answers. 
B. The Stop-Time Rule Applies to a Decriminalized 
Offense  
For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that once 
both requirements for the application of the stop-time rule were 
satisfied, the subsequent vacatur of Khan’s conviction did not 
remove him from the rule’s ambit.   
1. Vacatur Has No Effect on When an Offense 
was “Committed” 
For the first requirement, our answer is straightforward:  
The text of the stop-time rule speaks not to the existence of a 
conviction, but to whether the noncitizen “committed an 
offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2).”  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b(d)(1) (emphasis added).  Congress’s choice of 
“commission” over “conviction” is significant, for the plain 
meaning of commit is “to carry into action deliberately: 
perpetrate,” Commit, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate 
Dictionary (10th ed. 1995) (capitalization altered), or to 
“perform (convicted of committing crimes against the state),” 
Commit, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1993) 
(capitalization altered).  See also Commit, American Heritage 
Dictionary (3d ed. 1992) (To “perform, or perpetrate: commit 
a murder.”).  The “commi[ssion] [of] an offense,” in other 
words, “focus[es] upon the subject’s conduct,” Santos-Reyes, 
660 F.3d at 198–99, and is properly understood to connote 





With that understanding, the first clause is satisfied 
when the conduct itself “occur[s] on a particular date before 
the end of the seventh year of continuous residence, or [the] 
conduct . . . runs up to the date when the seventh year of 
residency ends,” regardless of “when the subject is criminally 
charged for the conduct” or is convicted of it.  Santos-Reyes, 
660 F.3d at 199.  That understanding accords with Barton, 
where the Supreme Court observed that a LPR who committed 
an offense before meeting the continuous-residence 
requirement would be ineligible for cancellation “even if . . . 
the conviction occurred after the seven years elapsed.”  140 S. 
Ct. at 1449.  It is also consistent with the way the Courts of 
Appeals and the BIA have discussed this requirement.  See 
Briseno-Flores v. Att’y Gen., 492 F.3d 226, 229 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(“[T]he commission of [an inadmissibility offense] effectively 
stops the time which counts toward the calculation of . . . 
continuous [residence].”); see also Heredia, 865 F.3d at 70–
71; Calix, 784 F.3d at 1012; In re Perez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 
693–94. 
In short, the stop-time rule’s requirement that a 
noncitizen “has committed an offense referred to in section 
1182(a)(2),” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1), pegs the date to the 
offense conduct—a matter of historical fact that is unaltered by 
the noncitizen’s conviction, much less by any vacatur of that 
conviction.   
2. Vacatur Due to Decriminalization of an 
Offense Has No Effect on Whether a 
Noncitizen is Rendered Inadmissible  
 For the second requirement, the focus shifts from when 
the noncitizen committed the inadmissibility offense to 




the United States under section 1182(a)(2),” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b(d)(1), meaning whether he was “convicted of, or . . . 
admits having committed, or . . . admits committing acts which 
constitute the essential elements of”5 the inadmissibility 
offense at issue, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i).  Where, as here, 
the agency has determined inadmissibility is based on the 
noncitizen’s “conviction,” rather than “admission,”6 we 
 
5 This statutory language predates and remains 
consistent with the general definition of “conviction” in the 
Immigration and Nationality Act:  
 
[A] formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered 
by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been 
withheld, where— 
(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or 
the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to 
warrant a finding of guilt, and 
(ii) the judge has ordered some form of 
punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s 
liberty to be imposed. 
 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A).  Both this definition and the stop-
time rule were introduced as part of the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).   
 
6 Notwithstanding Khan’s guilty plea and admissions at 
his plea colloquy, the IJ and BIA focused on Khan’s 
“conviction,” not “admissions.”  Because we may affirm only 




consider whether a subsequent vacatur of that conviction 
negates that consequence.    
As a general matter, the answer is no.  The immigration 
consequences of a criminal conviction are typically fixed at the 
time of conviction and not altered by post-conviction 
developments in the law.7  See, e.g., Vartelas v. Holder, 566 
U.S. 257, 261 (2012) (holding that the collateral effects of a 
noncitizen’s conviction were determined “by the legal regime 
in force at the time of his conviction”), Martinez v. Att’y Gen., 
 
537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002), we review the issue presented as 
involving only a “conviction” and will not consider whether 
Khan’s guilty plea renders him inadmissible for being a 
noncitizen “who admits having committed, or who admits 
committing acts which constitute the essential elements of” an 
inadmissibility offense.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i).  Neither 
will we consider any inadmissibility exception that Khan did 
not raise before the BIA, such as a waiver for “a single offense 
of simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana” under 
§ 1182(h).  See Rachak v. Att’y Gen., 734 F.3d 214, 218 (3d 
Cir. 2013); see also Heredia, 865 F.3d at 67 n.8 (noting that in 
defining inadmissibility, § 1182 also “includes criteria for 
various types of relief from inadmissibility”).     
 
7 As federal law governs immigration matters, it is 
federal law that prescribes what effect, if any, a state’s repeal 
or amendment of its criminal laws has on immigration 
proceedings.  See Acosta v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 218, 223 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (noting that a state legislature “obviously cannot 
dictate how the term ‘conviction’ is to be construed under 




906 F.3d 281, 287 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding that we “compare 
the [controlled substances] schedules at the time of conviction” 
and rejecting petitioner’s argument that his conviction did not 
trigger immigration consequences because it was not a 
categorical match with the current schedule (citing Mellouli v. 
Lynch, 575 U.S. 798, --, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1984 (2015)); Doe v. 
Sessions, 886 F.3d 203, 210 (2d Cir. 2018) (same); In re 
Velasquez-Rios, 27 I. & N. Dec. 470, 472 (BIA 2018) 
(describing the analysis of eligibility for cancellation of 
removal in connection with a conviction for a crime involving 
moral turpitude as a “backward-looking inquiry into the 
maximum possible sentence the alien could have received for 
his offense at the time of his conviction” (emphasis omitted)).   
According to Khan, however, a vacatur turns that 
general rule on its head so that, except in the narrow 
circumstance where a vacatur was granted on the basis of 
rehabilitation or immigration hardship, no vacated conviction 
carries immigration consequences.  Khan relies for this 
proposition on In re Pickering, where the BIA recognized “a 
significant distinction between convictions vacated on the 
basis of a procedural or substantive defect in the underlying 
proceedings and those vacated because of post-conviction 
events, such as rehabilitation or immigration hardships,” 
holding that only in the latter case does “the respondent 
remain[] ‘convicted’ for immigration purposes.”8  23 I. & N. 
 
8 Khan does not seriously contend that his conviction 
was “vacated on the basis of a procedural or substantive 
defect,” Pickering, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 624, in his underlying 
criminal case, nor could he.  Although he cited the Due Process 




Dec. 621, 624 (BIA 2003).  He also points to our opinion in 
Pinho v. Gonzales, according Chevron deference to Pickering 
and concluding, in the analogous context of assessing 
eligibility for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255,9 that 
“substantive vacaturs,” but not “rehabilitative vacaturs,” 
render the noncitizen “no longer [] ‘convicted’ for immigration 
purposes.”  432 F.3d 193, 209–10 (3d Cir. 2005) (applying 
Pickering to hold that a conviction vacated due to ineffective 
 
States Constitution and provisions of the Connecticut 
Constitution in his petition for destruction of record, the BIA 
and this Court consider in the first instance whether “the order 
explains the court’s reasons for vacating the conviction.”  
Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193, 215 (3d Cir. 2005).  Only if 
“the order does not give a clear statement of reasons,” is it 
permissible to look at “the record before the court when the 
order was issued,” id., and Khan’s order, which states “the 
Petition for Destruction of Record of Decriminalized Offense 
is GRANTED,” App. 9, reflects that his vacatur was based not 
on any substantive defect in the criminal proceeding, but on the 
state legislature’s policy decision to decriminalize an offense.  
See Prado v. Barr, 949 F.3d 438, 442 (9th Cir. 2020) 
(observing that a state’s reclassification of and reduction of 
penalties for certain marijuana convictions did not reveal “a 
‘substantive’ flaw in [those] conviction[s]”).     
 
9 As Barton observed, “Congress . . . made th[e] 
status—inadmissibility because of conviction or other proof of 
commission of § 1182(a)(2) offenses—relevant in several 
statutory contexts,” including “adjustment to permanent 





assistance of counsel reflected a defect in the underlying 
proceeding and therefore did not render the noncitizen 
ineligible for adjustment of status to permanent resident); see 
Rodriguez v. Att’y Gen., 844 F.3d 392, 397–98 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(same); see also Andrade-Zamora v. Lynch, 814 F.3d 945, 
949–50 (8th Cir. 2016) (applying Pickering in stop-time 
context); Saleh v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 17, 25 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(same). 
Khan is simply mistaken in his reading of Pickering.  
The BIA’s holding was not that only vacaturs based on 
“rehabilitation or immigration hardships” continue to function 
as convictions under the immigration code.  To the contrary, 
the agency identified those situations as illustrative, not 
exhaustive, examples of the broad category of cases in which 
“a court vacates a conviction for reasons unrelated to the merits 
of the underlying criminal proceedings, [and] the [noncitizen] 
remains ‘convicted’ for immigration purposes.”  Pickering, 23 
I. & N. Dec. at 624; see Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 639 
(1998) (noting that “use of the term ‘such as’ confirms, [a] list 
is illustrative, not exhaustive”).  In effect, then, Khan has the 
BIA’s position backwards:  Under Pickering, only if a 
conviction is vacated “based on a defect in the underlying 
criminal proceeding[],” does it cease to function as a 
“conviction” for immigration purposes.”  23 I. & N. Dec. at 
624; see also Pinho, 432 F.3d at 207–09.   
In sum, the vacatur of Khan’s conviction for an 
inadmissibility offense does not relieve him of the effects of 
the stop-time rule because it does not alter the historical fact 
that he committed the offense or that the offense “renders [him] 
inadmissible,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1), as a consequence of his 




“period of continuous residence ended when he committed his 
drug possession offense,” App. 7., and because he had not yet 
accrued the requisite seven years’ continuous residence, Khan 
is ineligible for cancellation of removal.   
IV. Conclusion  
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for 
review.   
